The Israeli regime has not yet been able to do in Lebanon what it has done in Syria. Although it has intensified its military aggressions against the country, in recent years it has always faced the Resistance’s ability to deter.
Israeli leaders make no secret of their fear that the deterrent force of Lebanese Hizbollah will be transferred to Syria. A problem that becomes increasingly worrying when Israeli leaders are fully aware of the strategic orientations of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the war against this regime.
The Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, published an article by Ali Haydar entitled “Concern that the Golan will turn into a second South Lebanon does not let the enemy sleep”.
The commander of the Israeli army’s Golan Division, Brigadier General Amit Fisher, said a few days ago that the major challenge is to avoid a South Lebanon 2.0 in the Golan.
The same concern is highlighted in the Israeli army’s 2018 strategic communiqué. “Syria, despite its inherent weakness, still has the ability to threaten Israel and remains the main source of resistance,” the statement said. This country is therefore “the main threat to this regime”. This is despite the fact that in 2015 the Israeli army described Syria as a “failed and disintegrating state”.
Although, in an effort to restore credibility to its deterrent capacity in the face of military political developments, the Israeli regime often tries to exaggerate the tactical gains it made during the war in Syria, the analysis of these gains reveals a much less glowing reality than Tel Aviv’s propaganda would have us believe.
For example, a senior Israeli expert stated that the so-called “battle between wars” strategy has failed to achieve its objectives.
It believes that the Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to restoring Syria’s capabilities, supporting the country and drawing attention to the growing threat posed by the northern front to the national security of the Israeli regime.
Fisher acknowledged in an interview with Israel Hayom that Tel Aviv’s calculations are not based solely on its own actions, but depend on the following strategic dimension: Is Israel capable, with or without the help of the Russians or Americans, of preventing Iran’s and Hezbollah’s activities in Syria?
Regarding Israel’s attempts to separate Syria from its allies within the Resistance axis and to build a sophisticated army supported by the Western camp, Fisher said: “In my opinion, there is no problem in creating such an army, and it would even be the best scenario. »
The worst case scenario would be that “we do not win on the ground strategically and tactically and that Hezbollah succeeds in pursuing its plan by increasing the number of its checkpoints and anti-tank units. In the next step, this movement would transfer its missile launch platforms, combat troops and commandos to Syria.
“As far as possible, we must fight Hezbollah directly or indirectly to ensure that control of the Golan never falls into the hands of Hezbollah and Hamas,” he added.
“The Golan Heights must remain the calmest border in Israel,” he continued. In Fisher’s mind, this means that Israel must keep a high hand in Syria, so that it can decide when, where and how to launch an attack.
In view of Israel’s multiple air strikes and missile attacks against Syria in recent years, Fisher acknowledged that Syria has a significant arsenal at its disposal. In particular, the Syrian DCA has been considerably strengthened to deal with the threats posed by this regime.
“When Bashar al-Assad asks how to solve the Golan problem, the answer is that Hezbollah is the only power in the region that can resist Israel,” he said.